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Price (in Bayes, 1958) introduced Bayes’s theorem as a precise and accurate method for measuring
the strength of an inductive argument. He contrasted Bayesian reasoning with common sense,
which, he argued, is imbued with vagueness and often erroneous. Nearly two centuries later, Price’s
claim was put to the test by psychologists who examined how people revise their opinions in light
of new evidence (e.g., Phillips and Edwards, 1966; Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). For the past
four decades, scholars have debated whether common sense can or cannot approximate Bayesian
reasoning.
Contrary to Price’s claim, earlier studies using a bookbags-and-poker-chips paradigm found that
people did follow Bayesian prescriptions to revise judgments although their numerical answers
were conservative: the psychological impact of new evidence on one’s belief was less pronounced
than warranted (Edwards, 1968). A paradigm shift ensued with the advent of the heuristic-and-
biases programme of research (Kahneman et al., 1982). Scholars started to use vignette studies
modeled after the so-called “textbook paradigm” or the “social-judgment paradigm” (Bar-Hillel,
1983). This also led to an about-turn in the portrayal of people’s ability to revise their judgments
accurately. Vignette studies did not showcase mere conservatism, they elicited biased judgments
which were often in blatant contradiction with Bayesian prescriptions. This bleak picture of people’s
ability to form Bayesian judgments was oncemore overturned in themid-nineties when researchers
demonstrated that natural frequency formats could lead to a fourfold improvement in performance
rates (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995; Cosmides and Tooby, 1996). This finding once more shifted
the point of scholarly contention as scholars started to debate whether the improvement observed
arises from the use of natural frequencies in and by itself or from the more effective “nested
representation” that this information format elicits (Sirota et al., 2015).
Throughout this (admittedly) short history of the psychological study of Bayesian reasoning,
Bayesian performance has most commonly been defined, explicitly or implicitly, as the ability
to generate the “accurate” value for the posterior probability p(H|D), or the probability that a
hypothesisH is true, given a new piece of evidenceD, based on the values of p(H), p(not-H), p(D|H)
and p(D|not-H) where p(H) denotes the a priori probability thatH is true and p(not-H), the a priori
probability that its alternative, not-H is true (which may or may not be equated with the base rates;
Mandel, 2014); p(D|H) denotes the probability of observing D when we know H to be true; and,
finally, p(D|not-H) denotes the probability of observing D when the alternative hypothesis, not-H
is true.
This approach to performance assessment—comparing a normative numerical value to a
subjective probability estimate—informs what is computed (a Bayesian answer, based on a correct
number or a correct algorithm) and enables researchers to assess Bayesian performance. Efforts
to improve Bayesian performance have focused on modifying environmental characteristics such
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as the probabilistic information format (e.g., Gigerenzer and
Hoffrage, 1995). But performance arises from the coupling of the
task environment and the cognitive processes applied to the task
at hand. Fostering better Bayesian performance can also involve
a better understanding of Bayesian reasoning, that is, how the
subjective estimate is actually computed (e.g., see Sirota et al.,
2014).
Adopting a reasoning-based focus also sheds light on
differences between the three classic paradigms mentioned above
that would otherwise remain concealed. While any of these
paradigms may be used interchangeably to assess Bayesian
performance, whether they all involve the same type of Bayesian
reasoning is debatable. This is not a trivial distinction: if different
paradigms invoke different reasoning processes, what works
for improving Bayesian performance will be contingent on the
particular research paradigm adopted to study performance. In
the remainder of this essay, we show that a focus on performance
(where participants’ probability judgments are compared to
Bayesian normative values or algorithms) obscures the fact
there are more than one way to engage in Bayesian reasoning.
Our analysis suggests three criteria against which the quality
of Bayesian inferences may be assessed: an accuracy criterion
(did participants compute the normative value? Did they apply
the correct algorithm?), an adequacy criterion (did participants
appropriately revise their initial judgment?), and a restructuring
criterion (did participants successfully restructure their initial
representation of the problem to achieve the goal state?).
The typical bookbags task involves two urns with symmetrical
assortment of marbles—e.g., a “black urn” with 600 black and 400
white marbles, and a “white urn” with 400 white and 600 black
marbles (Peterson et al., 1965). An experimenter selects one urn
at random and hides it in an opaque box from which he then
draws several samples of marbles. After observing each sample,
participants are asked to revise the probability that the sample
originates from one urn by moving a slider along a bar displaying
100 marks. The length of the bar’s left section represents the
probability that the marbles had been drawn from the black
urn. Participants’ output judgments can be compared with the
Bayesian norm. This involves computing p(D|H) and p(D| not-
H), the probabilities of observing the sampleD if it were obtained
from the black urn and the white urn, respectively. Even when
participants are informed about the exact ratio of marbles in each
urn, it is implausible to assume that they engage in such explicit
numerical computations to revise their judgment. Instead, belief
revision is more likely to arise from intuitive thinking processes
involving an assessment of the perceptual similarity between the
sample and the urn (e.g., see Read and Grushka-Cockayne, 2011).
In such a context, interventions on feedback and learning from
experience are more likely to improve Bayesian reasoning than
manipulations of information format, for example.
Social-judgment studies of Bayesian reasoning (e.g.,
Kahneman and Tversky, 1973) include social scenarios
and subjective probabilities implied by thumbnail verbal
descriptions instead of countable numerical information.
Typically, social-judgment tasks involve the assessment of the
posterior probability that an individual belongs to a target
category (e.g., engineer), based on both a short verbal description
of the individual’s social attributes (e.g., “spends most of his free
time on his many hobbies which include home carpentry, sailing
and mathematical puzzles” Kahneman and Tversky, 1973, p.
241) and the numerical base rate of the target category and an
alternative category (e.g., 30 engineers and 70 lawyers). So while
social-judgment tasks provide precise information about the
base rates, the numerical values of the likelihood probabilities
p(D|H) and p(D| not-H) of the descriptions are neither presented
to, nor elicited from the participants. By comparing subjective
posterior probability judgments made in this instance with
judgments made for reversed base-rate distributions (e.g., 70
engineers and 30 lawyers), it is possible to evaluate the extent
to which judgments are aligned with Bayesian prescriptions
just as with the bookbags paradigm. Once again, however,
these judgments are unlikely to arise from explicit numerical
computations akin to those required to compute the Bayesian
benchmark criterion since this would require that participants
spontaneously generate a numerical value for p(D|H) and p(D|
not-H). In fact, the actual origin of the estimate produced by
participants in Social-judgment tasks is unclear. The attribute-
substitution account (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002) theorizes
that participants use a heuristic attribute (e.g., the extent to
which the individual described is similar to a typical engineer)
as a substitute for the target attribute (e.g., the probability that
the individual is an engineer, given his description) in their
assessment. This account, however, does not explain how people
may compute the similarity index between the verbal description
of an individual instance and a typical instance. Dougherty
et al.’s (1999) MINERVA Decision-Making (MDM) model
proposes that judgments are based on less than perfect memory
retrieval of observations frequencies. The predictive value of the
MDM model is established by comparing averaged simulated
outputs with Bayesian computations and demonstrating that the
simulations derived from the model are consistent with actual
judgments observed in Social-judgment studies. This model is
underpinned by two assumptions: first, that social judgments
have a frequentist origin, and second that all individuals rely on
the same memory-based process to compute their judgment.
Both assumptions have yet to be tested empirically. In sum,
more research is needed before the cognitive processes that
yield such judgment methods in Bayesian reasoning can be
firmly established. In this respect, representational theories of
subjective probability such as Mandel’s (2008) representational
and assessment processes account may prove fruitful.
The last, and perhaps most prevalent, paradigm is the
so-called textbook one. In this paradigm, participants are
presented with explicit numerical values for all the components
required for computing the posterior probability p(H|D),
namely p(H), p(D|H) and p(D| not-H) as in, for example, the
mammography problem (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995). Once
again, performance may be assessed in the same way it is assessed
in bookbags tasks or in social judgment tasks: by comparing
participants’ judgment to the Bayesian criterion. The reasoning
processes, which lead to the final judgment, however, are unlikely
to be based on assessments of perceptual similarities (as in
bookbags tasks) or memory retrieval of observed frequencies
(as in social judgment tasks). Instead, textbook tasks require
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participants to reach a goal state (the posterior probability value)
based on an initial state presenting the values of the base rate, hit
rate and false alarm probabilities. In other words, textbook tasks
require participants to apply operators to move from an initial
state (the problem presentation) to a series of different states
until the final goal state is reached. These tasks do not require
an intuitive judgment of a probability value, they require analysis
and problem-solving skills. As such, problem-solving theory can
shed new light on the processes that underpin Bayesian reasoning
in textbook problems.
Problem-solving theorists often distinguish between routine
and non-routine problems (e.g., see Mayer, 1995). Routine
problems involve the application of a known procedure to be
solved. For example, 2 + 2 is a routine problem for anyone who
has been taught a procedure for adding single digits. Applying
the known procedure involves reproductive thinking; once the
procedure is known, problem solvers can apply it again to solve
similar problems. By contrast, when problem-solvers face non-
routine problems, they do not possess a pre-existing solution
procedure; they must engage in productive thinking and generate
a novel solution to reach the goal state. Textbook problems
presented to naive participants, that is participants who have
not learnt to apply the Bayesian procedure to compute p(H|D),
are difficult non-routine problems. Problem solvers may have
some operators which they can apply (like adding values or
multiplying them) but they have nomeans to gauge their progress
or assess the validity of their final answer. This suggests that
a possible way forward to better understand how participants
may succeed in textbook tasks would be to consider those
tasks as insight problems. From a set theoretic perspective,
the prior probability p(H) corresponds to the proportion of
the sample space S that is occupied by H. The occurrence
of the outcome d reduces the sample space to the event D
because the elements outside D are no longer possible outcomes.
Consequently, the probability of H given D is the probability
of H given the reduced sample space D. This analysis suggests
that Bayesian performance in textbook problems demands that
reasoners restructure their initial representation from the sample
space S defined by the union of subsets H and not-H that both
include d elements to the subset D that includes h and not-h
elements.
To sum up, in this essay, we argued for a distinction
between Bayesian performance and Bayesian reasoning.Whereas
Bayesian performance can be assessed through a variety of
paradigms, a focus on performance obscures the fact there are
more than one way to engage in Bayesian reasoning: people
may reason appropriately but perform poorly, thus committing
what is known as an “error of application” (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1982). Conversely, they may adopt an inappropriate
line of reasoning (thus committing an “error of comprehension,”
Kahneman and Tversky, 1982) but nevertheless produce an
accurate judgment. Our analysis suggests three criteria against
which the quality of Bayesian inferences may be assessed: an
accuracy criterion, an adequacy criterion, and a restructuring
criterion. Whereas the accuracy criterion is applicable in all
three paradigms, the adequacy criterion is better suited to
bookbags tasks because they require participants to revise an
initial judgment or the social-judgment tasks because they
ask participants to provide a subjective estimate that weighs
numerical-explicit and subjective-implicit information. Likewise,
the restructuring criterion is better suited to textbook tasks as
these tasks require participants to navigate through a problem
space. Each criterion also points to different strategies for
improving the quality of Bayesian inferences. The accuracy
criterion favors analytical accounts where reasoning is defined as
the step-by-step transformation of explicit numerical quantities
and facilitation results from easing the cognitive cost of carrying
out these computations. The adequacy criterion favors associative
accounts where reasoning is defined as belief updating and
facilitation results from the better calibration of the subjective
weights attributed to different inputs. Finally, the restructuring
criterion favors representational accounts where reasoning is
defined as navigating through a problem space and facilitation
results from the clarification of the representational structure of
the problem. In other words, better understanding how people
arrive at their answers in the different paradigms may prove a
fruitful way forward to uncover the keys to further improve the
quality of naive Bayesian inferences.
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